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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
UTAH SAND and GRAVEL PRODUCTS
CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
11341

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Condemnation giving rise to damages for the
taking of .92 acres for highway purposes, and claimed severance damages allegedly caused by changing the route of the access.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury awarded just compensation on the evidence for the property actually taken and no severance damages to the remaining property due to the
change of access.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a retrial to obtain additional
severance damages.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Summons was served upon the defendant in
this action on March 1, 1965, but the defendant did
not request a change in the widened road's meridian strip or access line until one year later (T. 37),
notwith standing the fact that the defendant's Vice
President, Mr. Knowlton, had been a State Highway
Engineer and knew or must have known in 1959 that
there would be an interchange with the state Highway U.S. 89 with its necessary safety features (T.
144), T - 61).
The trial court ruled that the limited access line
was an obviously necessary and reasonable safety
feature, well within the discretion of the highway
department and as such was lawfully and legally
taken (T. 31, T. 46}. The testlmony also showed that
there was still remaining suitable access from 7400
South Street (T. 75, T. 99, T. 100).
1

··The-testimony· showed that an inflated before
commercial value of the frontage land remaining
was almost solely caused by the planned highway
project and that if the highway system had not been
so projected there would be no damages at all (T.
95, T. 101). The defendant's own testimony was that
· there would· be no- severance damages if the properties before value had not been enhanced by the
proposed project (T, 114). This enhanced value was
still somewhat remote and speculative as the land
. jn que.stion.wa,s sJHl zoned for gravel purposes and
not for future commercial puq:_>q~~s (T. 64).
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Mr. Kay, called by the Appellant, testified that
on May 29, 1959, the State Road Commission held ·a
public meeting and that the location of the on-off
ramps at the interchange were known and discussed (T. 144, 145), and that approximately three (3)
weeks later the on-off ramps location became official
(T. 166). Mr. Kay's further testimony showed the facts
to be that the establishment of a non-access line just
off the ramps of the Interstate I-80 was consistent
policy decision necessary for I-80 to work effectively and according to plan (T. 173). Both projects were
so closely ir..terwoven that they are, in fact, the very
same project, (T. 168).
Since the facts obviously showed that the limited access line and any possible accompanying severance damages would only be caused by the enhancement in value of the remaining land due to
the same condemning project, the court below, properly and in its discretion, excluded any testimony
as to enhanced value on benefit caused by the condemning project itself (T. 90, 177).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID DETERMINE A NECESSITY OF THE LIMITED ACCESS, AND IF NOT, SUCH
DETERMINATION IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURDICTION OF THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES.

The defendant at no time presented any evidence that the establishment of a limited-access line
as per the project plans was not a necessary safety
feature in accord with the Highway Commission's
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reasonable policies. In fact, Mr. Kay, the Highway
Engineer, testified that it is their policy to attempt to
control access for a distance away from the intersection of the ramps of the interstate highway to preserve the integrity and capacity and safety features
of this particular highway (T. 173). It is clear that the
purpose of the non-access line is to protect cars moving off highway U.S. 80 from those moving along
U.S. 89, and vice versa (T. 155).
It is obvious from the record that the trial judge
felt that the Highway Commission acted as "reasonable human beings" (T. 31), and therefore, "ruled
that they are entitled to take what is known as a limited access line" (T. 46, 237). It is respectfully submitted that such a ruling is in fact a determination
that such safety features were obviously necessary
in accordance with the facts, a_nd Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Sections 78-34-4 (2) and 7834-8 (1) was fully complied with.
If such a ruling were held not to be a determinna tion that the non-access line was a necessary taking to such use of the highway system, it is submitted that U.C.A., 27-9-2 gives authority to the highway
authorities to establish limited-access facilities whenever they are of the "opinion" that present or future
traffic conditions justify it. Also, U.C.A., 27-9-3 says
"its determination of such desigh shall be final."
Since the determination of the Highway Commission
is final, and the court determined such a determination was necessa1y, the appelant has received more
consideration than it's entitled to.
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POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY USED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER
EVIDENCE AS TO THE ENHANCEMENT IN USE
AND VALUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY
CAUSED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HIGHWAY PROJECT ITSELF.

It is submitted that the defendant condemnee
not be permitted to collect the enhancement of
value to his property claimed as a severance damage to the remaining property as this enhancement
in value was caused by the very project that necessitated the change in access. If such a thing were allowed to take place in the state of Utah, it would
mean that funding, proposing and planning of all
future projects would have to be done in secret, else
the land-owners that were served with process later
would gain an unjust enrichment due to mere speculation of the proposed improvement itself. Such an
unjust result would not only cause horror to the common taxpayer, difficulties in administrative and engineering decisions, speculation in land values and
appraising, but also require the service of all summonses for the entire statewide highway project at
a simultaneous time.

Besides the evils mentioned here, it would seem
that to grant the defendant what is asked for would
be unconstitutional as the resulting damages would
not be just compensation. Such an injust enrichment
would seem to be unjust to both sides in the long
run.
In detrmining the just compensation required
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by the Firth Amendment to be paid to the owner of
property taken for a public use, no increment of
value arising by virtue of the fact that a particular
tract of land is clearly or probably within the project
involving the taking may be added. United States v
Cors, 337 US 325. 93 Led 1392. 69 S Ct 1086.
Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution
does not require compensation for damages not recognized as actionable at common law, but only for
damaging of property to an actionable degree. State
v. Fourth Judicial District, 94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502.
Merely because the highway project was planned
before summonses were served, the property owner
should not be allowed to collect a windfall of severance damages that would not be compensable at
common law. The case law and common sense dictate the correct policy of not allowing the defendant
in this case to submit prejudiced evidence to a jury
on enhancement in the value of his land by the very
projct for which it is taken.
27 American Jurisprudence 2d Section 282 page
71 says.
. . . . "Therefore, as a general thing, the enhanced
value due to the use for which the land was appropriated will not be included in the measure of compensation therefor."

27 American Jurisprudence 2d Section 283, page
79 says:
"In anticipation of the construction of a public improvement, the value of lands in the vicinity of the
proposed improvement frequently rises before the
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actual taking is effected by condemnation. As a general thing, under the greatly prevailing view, the
owner of land taken in eminent domain is not entitled to recover an increase or enhancement in the
value of his land due to the proposed improvement,
although there is authority to the contrary. In many
cases the right to enhancement has been denied
without any attempt to bring out the fact that, or
to draw a distinction on the basis of whether, at
the time of the enhancement sought to be recovered,
it was practically certain that the land in question
would be taken for the project.
Many courts hold that if it is known from the
beginning what the site of the new public work is to
be, the owner is not entitled to claim the benefit of
the general rise in values, since his land could never
have been expected to enjoy the proximity of the
improvement. An enhancement in value which is
merely in prospect and has not yet materialized at
the date of the condemnation clearly cannot be recovered. Moreover, enhancement subsequent to a
determination of the location of the improvement,
and after it has become practically certain that the
land in question will be embraced by the p:-..:ject,
is not, according to many cases, an element of the
owner's compensation for the land taken. In giving
effect to this rule, evidence of the enhanced market
value of lands adjoining the improvement, but not
included therein, has been excluded on the issue of
the market value of the lands actually taken. (emphasis added)

It has been stated that if lands are within the
area where they are likely to be taken for a public
purpose, but might not be, the owners are not entitled, if they are ultimately taken, to an increment
in value calculated on the theory that if they had not
been taken they would have been more valuable
because of their proximity to the land taken. Cole v.
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Boston Edison Co. 338 Mass 661. 157 NE2d 209, (1957).

The Appellant cites Nichols on Eminent Domain
and Orgel on Valuation as stating the same law as
to enhancement by the same planning project that
caused the taking. 147 American Law Reports p. 68
is quoted here to point out that the just result reached in each case should be more important to the
court than technicalities such as project numbering, naning and funding.
"Without at this point attempting to explain or reconcile the conflicting results reached in the numerous cases considering the question, it may be stated that the great weight of authority, as shown by
the results actually reached in the following cases,
denies to the owner the right to recover an increment or enhancement, due to the proposed improvement, in the value of the land taken." (emphasis
theirs)

The basic contention of the defendant landowner for a new trial is that the court should not
have ruled that the program of development at the
intersection of U.S. Interstate 80 and Highway 89 are
one and the same development. The court considered this at great length and concluded that he could
not in good conscience change his ruling to allow
such results. It was clear to him that the facts showed that there was no intersection, traffic, or ramps, in
the area before the announcement and construction
of highway 80. It was clear to him that the limited
access line for the main purpose of protecting the
cars using highway 80 and that it wouldn't have
been necessary but for the construction and use of
I-80. It was logical to him that the alleged change

from d gravel use to commercial was caused by the
same highway project. Any other reading of the facts
would dictate an unjust result.
The drawing introduced in evidence at the time
of the trial and made for the original public hearing
on proposed location of I-80 indicated that the interchange with its accompanying ramps and limitedaccess lines for safely merging traffic, were meant
to service I-80 even more than U.S. 89. Common
sense dictates a finding that the ordinary safety design features used on all such intersections would
be part of this project. The Appellant's own witness,
Mr. Knowlton, who was a state engineer at one time,
admitted that the "project engineers' proposed
plans" in existence disignated a necessary limited
access (T-56). He also said that the company knew
that there would be a complex interchange there
as a result of I-80 (T-61). The artist's drawing of the
plan for I-80 showed non-access fence poles as a
necessary part of the interchange to be constructed,
as testified to by Mr. Solomon (T. 93).
Mr. Kay, the state engineer, stated that the two
highways must necessarily be part of the same primary system (T. 147), and that any upgrading of U.S.
89 was due to the interstate funding and the practical need for highway connections (T. 151). All roads
need upgrading and repair but the change in use
here and the limited access were both caused by the
overall project known as Interstate Highway 80 and
its systems. Mr. Kay said, and it is logical to assume,
that Congress knew that all systems would have to
be integrated (T. 158), and that it naturally followed
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that the results would be that it would be used for
both interstate and local traffic (T. 159, T. 176). They
were just labeled different projects (T. 160), but the
two systems had to be "interwoven" as to planning
and department attitude and recommendations. Mr.
Kay also said,
"The interstate problem comes into this as far as
access at this particular location is concerned, because we attempted to control access for a distance
away from the intersection of the ramps to again
preserve the integrity and capacity and safety features of this particular highway." (T. 173)

which all shows that the facts and common sense
dictate that the trial court properly ruled in its discretion that reasonable minds could not differ as to
find that the limited-access line was a necessary part
of the same project (T. 90, 177).
As to the change in the highest and best use,
there can be no argument that if there was an alleged immediate change it would be caused solely
by the announcement of the new highway system.
Mr. Knowlton said that the value would be commercial chiefly because of I-80 (T. 36), and that the
"main event" causing a change in company position
toward the use of this land was the interstate system
(T. 60, 61).
All of Mr. Solomon's before values about enhanced commercial property would have been improperly admitted as the resulting opinion on market value would be caused strictly by the projects
proposal and construction (T. 80). He stated that his
comparable values were all as a result of being the
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first service area off the interchange (T. 86, 95, 101).
Mr. Barlow, the Appellant's other expert appraiser, also stated that the enhancement and subsequent change in use was due to the off ramps of
I-80 (T. 106). It should also be noted at this point
that any comparable sales of land sold at an inflated
value caused by the project would not have been
legally admissable as they were not comparable
anyway. In fact the admission of such sales might
have ben prejudicial to the State. See 27 Am Jur. 283
previously cited, also Cole v. Boston Edison Co. previously cited. It is also logical to assume that no informed buyer would pay top commercial price for
property that reasonably and according to the highway plans would have a limited access. So the highest and best use for the land after the project was
not an enhanced commercial value as claimed, but
for gravel purposes as zoned, and as properly found
by the jury.
The authorities that the Appelant cites for its
contention that it is entitled to an enhanced value
do not apply in this case. They would only
possibly apply in the case where the project is
definitely planned and then later enlarged by
another separate project. Such are not the facts in
this case. Here there is one project causing the enhancement and the taking.
The Appellant would have us believe that the
three Utah cases stand for the proposition that the
trial court should admit all evidence, whether prejudicial, relevant, or on enhanced non-compensable
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damages. The cases do not stand for the proposition
that evidence of non-compensable damages should
be admitted. The case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward. et al.. 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P.
(2d) 862 (1959) and subsequent cases really hold that
evidence as to further plans for the land condemned
must be reasonably potential and not too remote.
The abcve case is distinguishable in that there
were two separate and distinct projects that enhanced and took the defendant's land. One separate project was the enlargement of a resevoir and then the
other, the re-routing of the highway later caused the
taking of 5.6 acres. The two were obviously separate projects.
U.C.A. 78-34-10 (4) says damages should be assessed on:
. . . "how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or interest therein will be
benefited, if at all. by the construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff."

The obvious intent of the Utah Legislature was
to allow an offset for benefits and enhancements
conferred on the remaining land by the same project.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY USED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5 AND
EXCLUDING EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AS TO NONCOMPENSABLE DAMAGES.

In State of Utah by and through its Road Com·
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mission v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167, 397 P (2d) 463
(1964) this court said:
. . . "However, the projected use, affecting value,
must be not only possible, but reasonably probable.
It must not be merely in the realm of speculation
because the land is adaptable to a particular use
in the remote and uncertain future. In any event,
the admission (and I would assume rejection) of
such evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, which was not abused in .this case." (emphasis added).

It is submitted that the trial court in the instant
case did not abuse its discretion either.

Not only was such evidence inadmissable as
pertaining to an enhancement in value caused by
the very project causing the damages as per point
II of this brief, but also a consequential damage
caused by an impairment of access which is not a
compensable damage, especially where reasonable
access still remains as testified to in the trial court

(T. 75, 99. 100).

If the sovereign exercises its police power reasonably and for the good of all the people when constructing highways, consequential damages for empairment of ingress to and egress from property are
not compensable. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton.
10 U. 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960).

Absent an established easement, all that the
abutting owner is entitled to is some reasonable
means of access to the highway. Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963). As
pointed out earlier, there remained the same reas-
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onable access (T. 75, 99, 100) as was used 30 or ·40
times previously to qet on the land merely to check
it in the pr.ior 24 years (T. 54). Or in other words, the
access rema1ned reasonably the same, hence no
severance damages.
The. trial court _did not abuse its discretion
in
giving instruction Number 5 which in effect excluded legally fnadmissable evidence or non-compensable enhancement and damages. Instruction Number 5 is clea.rly given and effectively does what it
was meant to do, admit proper evidence. There was
not a knife thrust into the defendant's case so how
could this instruction twist a knife that is not there
in the first place.
POINT IV
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR MfSTRIAL.

A cursory reading of the trial transcript shows
tha.t the court properly and as simply as possible
explain~d ihe law as it should be applied in this case
as outlined in Point II herein, especially in light of
the facts then known. The trial court merely explainE?d to the jury why he did what he did, and in no
way prejudiced a: ·proper presentation of admissable
evidence by the appellant.
POINT V
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

The court's given instructions taken as a whole
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properly state the law of the State of Utah and appraisal technique as to market value and just compensation. The stock instruction given on market
value is simpler and better than the defendant's requested instruction Number 3.
The requested instruction Number 4 does not
properly state Utah law as quoted in the Jacobs case
above. The defendant's instruction hopes to collect
uncompensable damages by placing undue emphasis on a possible remote future highest and best use.
It would hardly be necessary to explain to the jury
the appraisal term of "highest and best use" since
they had sat through the testimony of four qualified
appraisers.
The testimony of Mr. Knowlton as to a commercial use due to ordinary increase in traffic was left
to be weighed by the jury (T. 215) and they apparently just didn't believe him as he had no comparable sales to substantiate his possibly biased opinion (T. 217). The jury simply believed Mr. Cain who
gave good concrete reasons why the remaining land
had never been, before or after the taking, inflated
commercial property (T. 222).
CONCLUSION
Taking this trial as a whole there was no mistrial of the defendant's case. The jury considered
all of the legally admissable testimony. They were
able to test the credibility of the witnesses, and were
afforded a view of the property. They also received
clear and intelligent instructions throughout the
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trial as to the proper elements of damages. They
properly returned a verdict of no money damages
to the remainder compensable or otherwise as they
were requested to do by the trial court in this case.
There is no reversible error when the trial is taken
as a whole. Therefore, in this case the properly impaneled and well-informed jury verdict should be
affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN R. MITCHELL
Attorney for Respondent
Suite 303 Upper Level
243 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

